I. Introduction
Let us call a sentential context semantically transparent if and only if all synonymous expressions are substitutable for one another in it salva veritate. A sentential context is semantically opaque if and only if it is not semantically transparent. Nathan Salmon has boldly advanced a refreshingly crisp theory according to which belief contexts are semantically transparent. 1 If he is right, belief contexts are much better behaved than widely suspected. 2 Impressive as it is, I do not believe that Salmon's theory is completely satisfactory. I shall not try to refute his theory, however. My aim is more modest. It is to show that his theory, in conjunction with a number of auxiliary but important claims he makes to buttress the theory, seems to lead to semantic opacity of belief contexts.
II. Salmon's Theory
Salmon's theory may be summarized as follows: 2 (A) The verb `to believe' is a dyadic predicate, expressing a dyadic relation the second relatum of which is a proposition, and when the verb takes a `that'-clause as its grammatical direct object, the second relatum is the proposition the `that'-clause refers to; (B) Any `that'-clause refers to the proposition expressed by (A) might appear vulnerable on two fronts. First, some philosophers might object to the construal of the belief predicate as 3 dyadic. Those philosophers might prefer to construe it as triadic, for example. But at the very least, the surface grammatical form of X believes that Y' and its logical behavior seem to suggest that the verb `to believe' is a dyadic predicate. That `to believe' is a dyadic predicate at least enjoys an initial plausibility, so that those who wish to deny it seem to bear a burden of justification. 5 Second, some philosophers might object to the invocation of propositions. The best-known objections against propositions are due to W. v. Quine, but many semanticists theorizing on belief sentences agree that those and other traditional objections against propositions are not conclusive. 6 As for (B), the best way to understand it seems to be to construe `that' as a singular-term forming sentential operator. This is a popular view and does not appear to be immediately objectionable. (C) seems even less controversial, provided that all the relevant parameters to which the expression relation is to be relativized are understood to be fixed. (D) is a straightforward instance of the principle of semantic compositionality, which appears hard to deny, except for contexts like direct quotational contexts.
I am reluctant to accept all of (A) -(D) myself. In particular, I am reluctant to accept (B) or (C). 
III. Semantic Transparency
To begin with, we need an uncontroversial pair of synonyms. I am not sure whether in fact there are such pairs. However, semantic transparency would be a vacuous thesis in the absence of a genuinely synonymous pair of expressions. For the sake of discussion, therefore, I shall assume that some pair of expressions are synonymous. I shall further assume that the verbs `to buy' and `to purchase' are such a pair. My choice of this particular pair is incidental. Salmon himself uses such pairs as `ketchup'/`catsup,' furze'/`gorse,' `color'/`colour' in British English, and `tomato' as pronounced in American English/`tomato' as pronounced in British English. 8 Nothing of importance hinges on a particular choice of synonyms. If `to buy' and `to purchase' need to be replaced with another, genuinely synonymous pair, our discussion will be easily modified to accommodate such a change.
Consider the following belief sentences:
(1) Jane believes that stock brokers buy stocks;
(2) Jane believes that stock brokers purchase stocks. and it is not the case that BEL (Jane, Pam, (4)).
Let us suppose that the possibility envisioned in (G) is actual.
Then Jane grasps Pam by means of (4) and not-BEL (Jane, Pam, (4)).
Assuming Jane's sufficient competence in English, and in particular, her full knowledge of the meaning of (4), this apparently makes it intuitively plausible to deny that (2) is true. But as we saw, (2) is true according to SST. Thus, SST faces the task of explaining the apparent plausibility of the falsity of (2). Salmon does provide an explanation for why (2) appears false when it is in fact, according to him, true. The explanation is as expected. The `that'-clause in (2) not only refers to Pam but also contains (4) as its embedded sentence. The fact that (4) occurs in (2) naturally gives rise to the (wrong) impression that (2)'s truth condition requires that Jane be disposed to assent to (4) as she (correctly) understands it.
Since Jane is not so disposed, it is easy to mistake (2) to be false. Thus, to utter (2) is a more misleading way to report Jane's belief than uttering (1). But (2) is no less true than (1), all the same.
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This is a smooth and elegant explanation of the apparent falsity of (2).
There is a different explanatory task SST faces as a result of taking (G) seriously. SST needs to explain how it could be the case that both BEL (Jane, Pam, (3)) and not-BEL (Jane, Pam, (4)). Such an explanation is made challenging by the assumption that Jane correctly and fully understands both sentences (3) and (4). To withhold belief from a proposition P is to grasp P and not accept P. In Salmon's terminology, for X to withhold belief from P is for X to grasp P by means of some w and not-BEL (X, P, w). 12 In particular, for Jane to withhold belief from Pam is for her to grasp Pam by means of some sentence S and not-BEL (Jane, Pam, S). Jane grasps Pam by means of (4) and she is not disposed to assent to (4) as she understands (4), There is yet another, related need for explanation. SST needs to justify the asymmetry it postulates between BEL and non-BEL.
Provided that all supportive conditions are met, according to SST, the fact that BEL holds among Jane, Pam, and (3) is sufficient for the truth of (1) and (2), whereas the fact that non-BEL holds, or BEL fails to hold, among Jane, Pam, and (4) is insufficient for the falsity of (1) or (2) . Why is such a theory preferable to a rival theory which reverses the asymmetry and says that given all supportive conditions, the fact that BEL fails to hold among Jane, Pam, and (4) is sufficient for the falsity of (1) and (2), whereas the fact that BEL holds among Jane, Pam, and (3) is insufficient for the truth of (1) or (2)? 13 Commitment to face such a challenge constitutes the fourth and last auxiliary claim:
(I) It needs to be explained why, when X grasps P by means of S, obtainment of BEL among X, P, and S suffices for X's believing P, whereas failure of obtainment of BEL among X, P, and S does not suffice for X's not believing P. Jane does not realize that she is looking at one and the same person.
As a result, she immediately comes to perceive the person whose image is reflected on the north mirror to be a man in a (uniformly) red suit, and waves toward the mirror--she likes red, so she likes people in red suits. She also perceives the person whose image is reflected on the south mirror to be a man in a (uniformly) blue suit, and does not wave toward the mirror--she is indifferent to blue, so she is indifferent to people in blue suits. She greets Chuck as she sees him to the north and fails to greet him as she sees him to the south.
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There is nothing mysterious or pathological about this combination of Jane's action and inaction toward Chuck in those circumstances.
The object of Jane's perception remains the same, viz., Chuck.
But the intermediaries (the mirrors) differ and this gives rise to the two apparently conflicting reactions. Similarly, when Jane both believes Pam and withholds belief from Pam, the object of Jane's attitudes remain the same, viz., Pam. But the intermediaries (the sentences (3) and (4)) differ and this gives rise to the two apparently conflicting attitudes. The perceptual analogy shows that there is nothing mysterious or pathological about this. An explanation of the kind (H) calls for is thus provided.
Jane sees Chuck on the north mirror and waves at him in that direction. This is sufficient for her greeting Chuck. Jane sees Chuck on the south mirror but does not wave at him in that direction. This is not sufficient for her not greeting Chuck. All in all, Jane does greet Chuck. Analogously, when Jane grasps Pam by means of (3) and BEL (Jane, Pam, (3)), it is sufficient for her believing Pam, whereas when Jane grasps Pam by means of (4) but not-BEL (Jane, Pam, 
VI. Propositional Appearance
Chuck is one man, and Jane sees him twice over. That is reality.
The mirrors make it seem to Jane as if she saw two different men.
That is appearance. Let us look at the appearance a little more closely. From Jane's point of view, it appears as if there were two men in the Hall with her. On the north mirror Chuck appears to Jane to be clad in red, and on the south mirror he appears to Jane to be clad in blue. In appearance, the Hall seems to contain exactly two men who are clearly distinguishable from each other. Jane can gather as much specific visually available information as she cares about Chuck by examining the reflections. And such information is correct information about Chuck, we shall assume, for the mirrors do not deceive Jane in any regard other than concerning the identity of the man she sees to the north and the man she sees to the south and their 15 sartorial chromatic attributes.
Jane's opposing reactions toward Chuck are explained by reference to the two different mirrors. Thus, (5) Via the north mirror Jane takes Chuck to be clad in red but does not take him to be clad in blue, and via the south mirror Jane takes Chuck to be clad in blue but does not take him to be clad in red; (6) Jane's taking Chuck to be clad in red via the north mirror explains why she waves at him as she sees him on the north mirror, and her taking Chuck to be clad in blue via the south mirror explains why she does not wave at him as she sees him on the south mirror. The answer cannot be merely that Jane takes Pam to be the proposition (3) expresses. There are two problems with it.
First, it would falsify (#). It is evidently not the case that Jane accepts Pam as she grasps it by means of (3) because she takes (3) to express the proposition (3) expresses. To say otherwise is to put the cart before the horse. Jane accepts Pam as she grasps it by means of (3) because she takes (3) to express a certain particular proposition she believes. For any sentence S, if Jane thought S expressed that same particular proposition, Jane would be disposed to assent to S, thus accepting the proposition as she grasped it by means of S.
(This suggests an objection to any theory, including SST, that analyzes propositional attitudes in terms of sentential attitudes.
The objection says that any such theory puts the cart before the horse. Jane's disposition to assent to (3) should be understood as a product of Jane's belief of Pam and her correct understanding of (3); her belief of Pam and understanding of (3) are conceptually prior to her disposition to assent to (3). Salmon himself speaks approvingly of "the traditional conception of belief as inward assent to a proposition." 15 Such a conception seems to be closer to the truth than SST, which makes disposition to assent to a sentence conceptually prior to belief. One could, of course, say that this only reminds us that SST is not Salmon's official theory. This would be fair enough and is in fact true. But the reason we chose to focus on SST rather than Salmon's official line is that SST is a fuller theory. Also, Salmon appears to suggest that one should understand "inward assent to a proposition" as assent to a proposition by means of some intermediary, which SST construes as a sentence. If so, this does not help clarify how he can avoid putting the cart before the horse after all. Our challenge to Salmon then would be to press him for a comparably full alternative theory.)
The second problem is closely related to the first, though distinct from it. In the perceptual case, Jane does more than taking Chuck to be the man whose image the north mirror reflects. Just by 18 noticing the north mirror to reflect a unified man-shaped image, she takes the mirror to reflect an image of some man or other. By a closer examination of the reflection, she obtains further information about the man, that he is wearing a red suit. Similarly, just by regarding (3) to be an unambiguous grammatical sentence, Jane takes (3) to express some proposition or other. What further information does Jane obtain by closer understanding of (3)? This goes to the heart of the matter. Jane's linguistic understanding of (3) corresponds to her visual examination of the reflection. To take Pam to be nothing more than the proposition (3) expresses is like barely seeing Chuck (due to extreme myopia, say) and taking him to be nothing more than something whose image the north mirror reflects.
Just as she is an acute seer, Jane is a competent speaker of English, understanding (3) and (4) correctly and fully. We should respect this fact in replacing `M' and `Q' to verify (*) and (#). That is, we should reject any replacement that makes Jane indistinguishable from a less than fully competent English speaker. 16 VII. Semantic Opacity Should we replace `M' with `Pam'? No. Jane takes (3) to express a certain particular proposition because she understands (3).
Moreover, her understanding of (3) is the correct understanding of It might be objected that by insisting on verifying (*), I am being unfair to SST. When Jane attributes a property to a man on a perceptual basis and fails to attribute the same property to the same man on another perceptual basis, she need not be doing so on qualitatively different perceptual bases. Suppose that the north and the south images of Chuck look exactly alike to Jane, and yet Jane takes them to be images of two men. Since she thinks the man she sees to the north is different from the man she sees to the south, she might perfectly well think differently of these men and behave differently toward the two mirrors. Furthermore, she might be so disoriented as to be unable to specify the two men she appears to be seeing either as "the north one" and "the south one" or as "the right one" and "the left one." She might only be able to specify them as "that one," while pointing in one direction, and "that other one," while pointing in another direction. No matter, it is perfectly metaphysically possible for Jane to think that she is seeing two radically indistinguishable men. Analogously, it might be asked rhetorically, why could it not be the case that Jane takes (3) and Let us apply this to the belief case and say that Jane takes (3) to express a P, while taking (4) to express another P.
What would `P' be? Obviously `Pam' will not do, for `a Pam' and another Pam' are nonsensical. 18 It is also clearly unsatisfactory to say simply that Jane takes (3) to express a proposition, while taking (4) to express another proposition, for this makes Jane indistinguishable from a less than competent speaker. There does not seem to be any plausible candidate for `P.' It is equally unpromising to replace `M' with `a true proposition' and `Q' with `an untrue proposition,' for it still fails to distinguish Jane from a less than perfectly competent speaker. Jane understands (3) and assigns a specific content to it.
She also takes every sentence with that content as expressing a true proposition. That is why via (3) she takes Pam to be a true If we accept (7) and (8), as it seems inescapable, then our question is answered, provided that taking Pam to be the proposition that stock brokers buy stocks is not the same as taking Pam to be the proposition that stock brokers purchase stocks. More accurately, provided that (7) does not entail (9) or that (8) does not entail (10): This means that our question is answered only if a substitution of purchase' for `buy' in (7)--or a substitution of `buy' for purchase' in (8)--is not salva veritate. 19 This is my argument for the existence of semantically opaque attitude contexts from SST plus the other auxiliary claims. The context in which `buy' occurs in (7) is semantically opaque; so is the context in which `purchase' occurs in (8). 20 
VIII. Opacity of Belief Contexts
This still does not give us semantic opacity of belief contexts. I now argue that if the sentential context of (7) in which `buy' occurs is semantically opaque, then belief contexts are semantically opaque.
Suppose that the context in which `buy' occurs in (7) is semantically opaque, and in particular, that it is possible for (7) to be true and (9) false. Let us now ask the following question:
What is the correct way to parse (7)? A number of different answers are possible, but I think there are only two reasonably plausible candidates. The first says that (7) predicates a quadratic relation and the second says that it predicates a triadic relation. I claim that the first is inconsistent with SST and the second makes belief contexts semantically opaque.
The quadratic analysis, which is the most faithful to the surface form of the sentence, says that (7) predicates the relation, "Via ( ) ( ) takes ( ) to be ( )," among (3), Jane, Pam, and the proposition that stock brokers buy stocks. Ex hypothesi it is possible for the quadratic relation to hold among (3), Jane, Pam, and the proposition that stock brokers buy stocks, without holding among (3), Jane, Pam, and the proposition that stock brokers purchase stocks. So, the proposition that stock brokers buy stocks is not identical with the proposition that stock brokers purchase stocks.
But this seems impossible to reconcile with the conjunction of (B), (C), and (D), which entails that `that stock brokers buy stocks' and that stock brokers purchase stocks' refer to the same proposition.
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The triadic analysis treats (7) as consisting of three names, (3),' `Jane,' and `Pam,' and one predicate, `Via ( ) ( ) takes ( ) to be the proposition that stock brokers buy stocks.' This long triadic predicate is regarded as lacking any semantically significant internal structure, so that the result of substituting `purchase' for buy' in it is an altogether different structurally unconnected predicate. This eliminates the basis for semantic transparency of the context in which `buy' occurs in (7) . But it similarly eliminates the basis for semantic transparency of the context in which `buy' occurs in (1), a belief context. It is theoretically not impossible to detach the treatment of the `that'-clause in (1) from the treatment of the `that'-clause in (7), so as to preserve the semantic transparency of (1) without preserving the semantic transparency of (7). But such a maneuver seems totally unmotivated.
IX. More Opacity
Given our discussion in Section VII, we should be able to predicate many de re relations between Jane and Pam: (11) Jane believes Pam because she takes it to be the proposition that stock brokers buy stocks; (12) Jane withholds belief from Pam because she takes it to be 25 the proposition that stock brokers purchase stocks.
If our discussion in Section VII was right, the contexts in which buy' and `purchase' occur in these sentences are semantically opaque. Or consider:
(13) Jane takes the proposition that stock brokers buy stocks to be the proposition that stock brokers buy stocks.
The contexts in which `buy' occurs first in (13) When he takes it as a singular proposition of self-identity between the first heavenly body sometimes visible in such-andsuch location at dusk and itself, he unhesitatingly assents inwardly to it. When he takes it as a singular proposition identifying the first heavenly body sometimes visible in suchand-such location at dusk with the last heavenly body sometimes visible in so-and-so location at dawn, he has no inclination to assent inwardly to it, and may even inwardly dissent from it. Notice that none of these sentences contains a specification of a proposition by means of a `that'-clause. All of these sentences are free of even an appearance of semantic opacity. I suspect that this is no accident. I am inclined to speculate that Salmon is aware of the possible threat of an argument like the one I have given for semantic opacity, and as a result has tried to steer clear of the kind of locution which would make him vulnerable to such an argument.
This naturally suggests an obvious rebuttal to my argument for opacity. It is to restrict one's locutions concerning attitudes 29 about propositions to the ones like (18) -(23) and refuse to grant locutions using `that'-clauses in a crucial way, such as (7) - (15) .
The problem with such a rebuttal is that it is unmotivated.
What reason is there for such a move except the desire to block the argument for semantic opacity? The ad hoc-ness becomes especially acute when we take (H) seriously. There is much to be said about how Jane takes Pam to be two different propositions, as a result of which she directs apparently conflicting attitudes toward Pam simultaneously. It is an important part of our explanation that she take Pam to be the proposition that stock brokers buy stocks and also takes Pam to be the proposition that stock brokers purchase stocks.
To say less than this--e.g., merely to say that Jane takes Pam to be the proposition (3) expresses and also takes Pam to be the proposition (4) expresses, while believing that (3) and (4) express different propositions--is not good enough.
Another reason why Salmon should not refuse uses of `that'-clauses in the relevant way under discussion is that he comes very close to using a `that'-clause in that way himself:
He or she understands both `Furze is furze' and `Furze is gorse' without recognizing their synonymy. In particular, he or she understands `Furze is gorse', but fails to recognize the proposition thus expressed as the logical truth that furze is 30 furze.
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Adapting it to our example, we might as well take Salmon as saying:
(24) Jane fails to recognize the proposition expressed bỳ Buying is purchasing' as the logical truth that buying is buying.
If we may use a `that'-clause in this way, why may we not use `that'-clauses as we do in (7) - (15) The difference between (7) and (27) (28) entails that the truth that buying is purchasing is a logical truth. But is it? It seems not.
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Another reason why a refusal to use `that'-clauses in the relevant way is ill motivated is that there are non-attitudinal locutions (at least on the surface) which are obviously respectable locutions and which employ `that'-clauses that way: e.g., (16) But such a view is unconvincing. Suppose that Jane correctly understands the verbs `to buy' and `to purchase' but doubts their strict synonymy. She cannot think of any counterexample to their synonymy but suspects that a sufficiently clever analytic philosopher could produce one. Furthermore, she suspects that the difference between the two verbs is such that one verb applies to what stock brokers do but the other verb does not, even though she is totally unable to articulate the difference. As a result, she is differently disposed to (3) and (4). She thinks that she is dealing with two radically indistinguishable propositions, just as she might be unable to distinguish Chuck by means of the two mirrors and yet think that she is seeing two radically indistinguishable men. This seems to be a perfectly possible situation. because she takes it to express the proposition that stock brokers buy (i.e., purchase) stocks, which is expressed by (3), while failing to be disposed to assent to (4) because she takes it to express the proposition that stock brokers purchase (i.e., buy) stocks, which is expressed by (4). Again, to ground a difference in propositional attitude on a difference in sentential attitude is to put the cart before the horse.
20. The perceptual analogy I relied on in my argument is good enough for the Salmonesque purposes of satisfying (H) and (I). But the parallelism is not perfect and this might be interpreted as symptomatic of an independent problem in SST. Consider Janah, Jane's myopic cousin from abroad who knows little English. Janah knows that buy' is a transitive verb and also knows the meaning of the word stock,' but she knows nothing else (relevant) about (3). In such circumstances it seems fair to say that Janah partially understands (3) but fails to grasp Pam, or any other proposition, by means of (3). In contrast in the Hall of Mirrors, even though Janah is unable to figure out much of anything about the north reflection beyond the fact that it is an image of something, she nonetheless succeeds in seeing Chuck. Her vision of Chuck by means of the mirror is terribly blurred, but blurred perception is still perception. Janah's perception of Chuck by means of the north mirror is as de re as Jane's, whereas Janah does not stand in any de re relation to Pam by 42 means of (3) but Jane does. This shows that while the perceptual relation Jane bears to Chuck and the belief relation she bears to Pam are equally de re, the de re-ness of perception is independent of the perceptual content but the de re-ness in the case of belief is not independent of the propositional content which Jane takes (3) to have. This is an important disanalogy between the perceptual case and the propositional case. This means that Salmon's grasping relation is not properly analogized by perception. Whether this should be taken as an objection to Salmon or not, it is important to note that our discussion in the text is independent of it. Our discussion shows that even if we confine our attention to Jane, with whom there is parity in de re-ness between perception and belief, SST still faces a difficulty.
21. All four quotations are from Frege's Puzzle, 113.
22. "Relative and Absolute A Priority," 86.
23. Salmon might regard this merely as an objection to his selfconscious pretense he adopts for the purposes of his discussion that the property of being a logical truth is a property of propositions.
Salmon says that it is really sentences that are logically true, not
propositions, but that he chooses to speak for the sake of discussion as if it were propositions that were logically true, not sentences; 25. This example is directly adapted from Steven Rieber,
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"Understanding Synonyms without Knowing that They are Synonymous,"
Analysis 52 (1992), 224-28.
26. Versions of a predecessor to this paper were presented at Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York, and University of Florida in April of 1994. I thank all participants at both universities and Nathan Salmon for helpful discussion. I also thank two anonymous referees for useful comments.
